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DRUGS, ATHLETES, AND THE NCAA: A
PROPOSED RULE FOR MANDATORY
DRUG TESTING IN COLLEGE
ATHLETICS
Drugs which allegedly enhance athletic performance have
become an integral part of the training regimen of a growing
number of American college athletes.1 Although many athletes
are motivated to participate in athletics for personal satisfaction, others are motivated by winning and the trappings of success. 2 This emphasis on winning has increased the pressure on
the athlete to succeed.3 Consequently, 4many athletes use drugs
to enhance their athletic performance.
At its 1984 convention, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) recognized the harm that could result from
an athlete's improper use of drugs. 5 In response, the NCAA empowered its Executive Committee 6 to draft a comprehensive
1. See Properand Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973) (statement of Dr. Donald
Cooper, American Medical Association Committee on Medical Aspects of
Sports, and Team Physician, Oklahoma State University) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings], 146-49 (statement of Phillip Shinnick, Director of Athletics,
Livingston College, Rutgers University, and former NCAA All-American),
152-60 (statement of Jack Scott, Ph.D., Athletic Director and Chairman of
the Physical Education Department of Oberlin College, and Director of the
Institute for the Study of Sport and Sociology), 272-76 (statement of Harold
Connolly, former Olympic champion and track coach).
For some examples of recent articles about the use of drugs in athletics,
see Looney, A Test With Nothing But Tough Questions, SPORTS ILLUS., Aug.
9, 1982, at 24; Neff, Caracas:A Scandal and a Warning, SPORTS ILLUs., Sept.
5, 1983, at 18; Todd, The Steroid Predicament,SPORTS ILLus., Aug. 1, 1983, at
62.
2. See generally J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 183-333 (1976) (gen-

eral discussion of sports and upward escalation, the pressures to win in college, university athletic programs, and athletic motivations).
3. See supranote 2.
4. See supra note 1.
5. See infra note 7.

6. The NCAA Executive Committee is a 14 member group which transacts NCAA business between the Association's annual conventions. The
Executive Committee, which meets at the direction of the NCAA president,
is basically a financial group which controls the Association's purse-strings.
NCAA CONST. art. 5, § 2, reprintedin 1984-85 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 38 (1984). By empowering the Executive

Committee to draft a drug testing rule, the NCAA convention actually did
nothing more than empower the Executive Committee to make the necessary expenditures for research and drafting of the rule.
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drug-testing rule for presentation at the 1985 NCAA convention. 7
Although a drug-testing rule may be necessary to reduce the
athlete's use of potentially harmful performance-enhancing
drugs, the rule may be subject to constitutional challenge as an
intrusive measure which unnecessarily singles out athletes from
their peers. 8 Because the courts have previously scrutinized
NCAA rules and sanctions under the due process 9 and equal
protection' ° clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United
7. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Res. No. 163, entitled Drug
Testing, states:
Whereas, the use of controlled substances and allegedly performanceenhancing drugs represents a danger to the health of the students and a
threat to the integrity of amateur sports;
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that the NCAA Executive Committee
be directed to develop an ongoing program of drug testing to identify
those students involved in intercollegiate athletics competition who
have used either controlled or allegedly performance-enhancing drugs;
and
Be It Further Resolved, that when fully implemented, the program
would include sanctions against those students who were found to have
used prohibited drugs; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the NCAA Executive Committee shall inform each member of the Association of all details of the proposed testing program, including a list of prohibited substances, before July 1,
1984; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the NCAA Executive Committee present
the proposed program and legislation necessary to implement it to the
1985 Convention.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, Res. 163 (1984 Convention). In
this case, the resolution simply empowers the NCAA to adopt a permanent
drug-testing rule.
8. A drug-testing rule which requires that only athletes submit to drug
testing, while excluding the rest of the student population from testing,
could be construed to create an unreasonable classification in violation of
the equal protection clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra notes 9,
10, 59 & 75 and accompanying text.
9. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of the due process clause, see infra notes 75-114 and accompanying
text.
10. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states in
relevant part that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of the equal protection clause, see infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
For examples of athletes' challenges of NCAA rules and sanctions, see
Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (due
process scrutiny of NCAA's minimum grade point rule); Wiley v. NCAA, 612
F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1979) (dictum) (discussion of Supremacy Clause and
equal protection in context of NCAA rule concerning scholarship athlete's
right to Basic Equal Opportunity Grant), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980);
Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (due process scrutiny of
NCAA rule limiting the number of athletic coaches); Regents of the Univ. of
Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977) (basketball players bring due
process challenge to NCAA determination of ineligibility), cert. disn'd, 434
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States Constitution, the NCAA Executive Committee should
draft a drug-testing rule that will withstand such a challenge.
After discussing the need for a drug-testing rule in college
athletics, this comment will analyze the importance of the
courts' conclusion that the NCAA is a state actor. The comment
will then address the past equal protection and due process
challenges to NCAA actions as well as privacy considerations.
The comment will conclude with suggestions intended to balance the need for a drug-testing rule with the athlete's constitutionally protected rights.
DRUGS AND COLLEGE ATHLETICS

The extent of drug use by athletes is difficult to quantify."
U.S. 978 (1977); Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Athletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d
492 (1st Cir. 1977) (equal protection challenge to rules made by NCAA's Puerto Rican counterpart); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (equal
protection and due process challenges to NCAA rules and sanctions); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (equal protection challenge
to NCAA's "Five-Year Rule," and "1.600 Rule" and "Foreign Student Rule");
Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974) (equal protection challenge to NCAA "1.600 Rule"); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417
F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976) (equal protection and due process challenge to
NCAA rules and sanctions), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1976); Buckton v.
NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) (equal protection challenge to
NCAA " Foreign Student Rule").
For a discussion of the background of athletes' constitutional rights, see
Buss, Due Process in the Enforcement of Amateur Sports Rules, in LAW &
AMATEUR SPORTS 1 (R. Wakukauski ed. 1982); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS, §§ 1.01-10.28 (1978); Carrafiello, Jocks Are People Too: The
Constitution Comes to the Locker Room, 13 CREIGtrrON L. REV. 843 (1980);
Gaona, The National CollegiateAthletic Association,FundamentalFairness
and the Enforcement Program,23 ARIz. L. REV. 1065, 1091-1101 (1981); Martin, The NCAA and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 NEW ENG. 383, 393-403
(1976); Comment, A Student-Athlete's Interest in Eligibility: Its Context
and ConstitutionalDimensions, 10 CONN. L. REV. 318, 333-349 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, ConstitutionalDimensions]; Comment, The NCAA,
Amateurism, and the Student Athlete's ConstitutionalRights Upon Ineligibility, 15 NEW ENG. 597, 600-625 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Amateurism); Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the
National CollegiateAthletic Association,24 STAN. L. REV. 903, 916-929 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Review).
11. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 10-11 (statement of Dr. Cooper); 134-52
(statement of Phillip Shinnick); 152-68 (statement of Jack Scott); 204 (statement of Dr. Hanley). Although some organizations have attempted to quantify athletes' drug use through questionnaires, the results are not consistent
with the opinions of the experts. Compare Drug Use Survey of Big Ten Athletes (compiled by the Drug Education Committee of the NCAA) (8% of
football player respondents admitted amphetamine or steroid usage) with
Hearings,supra note 1, at 150 (statement of Mr. Shinnick) (68% of University of California football team admitted using amphetamines or steroids).
See generally Castro, The Big CaracasDrug Bust, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 70;
Looney, A Test With Nothing But Tough Questions, SPORTS ILLUS., Aug. 9,
1982, at 24; Neff, Caracas:A Scandal and a Warning,SPORTS ILLUS., Sept. 5,
1983, at 18; Sanoff, Drug Problem in Athletics; It's Not Only the Pros, U.S.
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In 1973, Congress held hearings on the use of controlled drugs
by athletes. 12 Witnesses testified that a growing drug problem
existed in college athletics and that the only way to identify the
13
extent of the problem was to test the athletes for drug use.
& WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 64; Underwood, "I'm Not Worth A
Damn..... "SPORTS ILLUS., June 14, 1982, at 66 (discussion of personal experiences with recreational drugs).
Athletes use amphetamines to increase endurance and aggressiveness.
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 7-9 (statement of Dr. Donald Cooper of the
American Medical Association Committee on the Medical Aspects of
Sports, and team physician, Oklahoma State University). The abuse of amphetamines may cause psychological and physical dependence, weight loss,
an increase in REM sleep, apathy, and depression. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 72 (25th ed. 1974).
In addition to amphetamines, some athletes, such as football players
and weightlifters, use steroids to improve their strength and to gain weight.
"Steroid" is a generic name for a group of drugs that are hormones or synthetic hormone substitutes. Certain types of steroids may increase the
amount of male hormones in the body of a male or a female. This increased
hormonal level may cause the body to take on masculine characteristics, to
assimilate protein more rapidly and to gain weight. See H. BECKMAN, PHARNEWS

MACOLOGY: THE NATURE, ACTION AND USE OF DRUGS 596-638 (2d ed. 1951);

Todd, The Steroid Predicament,SPORTS ILLUs., Aug. 1, 1983, at 62. The possible side effects of steroid use include arteriosclerosis, hypertension, liver
damage, decrease in testicular size and sperm production in men, and general masculinization of women. H. BECKMAN, supra,at 596-638; Todd, supra,
at 62-66. For a scientific discussion of steroids and their affect on muscles
and motor skills, see

GOLDING, EROGENIC

AIDS AND MUSCULAR PERFORM-

(1972).
The increased use of steroids by athletes may be the single most pressing concern of the administrators of amateur sports. Even athletes who
would not ordinarily take drugs have been taking steroids to stay abreast of
their competition. The controversy is summed up by an athlete who stated
that:
It's simply not fair to allow one athlete to use a substance which both
research data and empirical observation suggest is effective in producing material strength gains, when a second athlete for medical and/or
ethical reasons chooses not to use the substance. The non-user has the
right to expect the administrators of a sport to support policies which
protect both fairness in competition and the good health of the athletes.
Todd, supra, at 68.
Finally, athletes use therapeutic drugs and pain killers to overcome the
deleterious effects of minor injuries. These types of drugs are usually prescribed to athletes who have an injury that will not be aggravated through
continued participation. Some doctors may, however, inject athletes with
pain killers even when it may seriously worsen the athlete's condition. See
Hearings,supra note 1, at 255-57 (statement of Dr. Donald Spencer) (types
of injuries which doctors could treat with anesthetics or analgesics).
12. See supra notes 1 and 11.
13. See supra note 1. But see Hearings,supra note 1, at 65-80 (statement
by Robert Pritchard, Chairman of the NCAA Drug Education Committee)
(drug education is a visible means by which to end minor drug problems in
athletics). For a discussion of the drug testing controversy in athletics, see
Looney, A Test With Nothing But Tough Questions, SPORTS ILLUS., Aug. 9,
1982, at 24.
ANCES
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One witness testified that a urinalysis 14 conducted upon 41 volunteers out of 300 track and field competitors revealed that 25
5
athletes had traces of controlled drugs in their systems.'
Besides estimating the broad extent of the use of drugs by
athletes, the congressional hearings also adduced testimony
that drugs are potentially harmful to the athlete. 16 Although
some doctors continue to prescribe allegedly performance-enhancing drugs to athletes, modern medical opinion holds that
the unnecessary prescription or use of any drug carries with it
the risk of harmful side effects. 17 While performance-enhancing
drugs rarely cause the death of an athlete, 18 physicians frequently cite liver damage, liver cancer, arteriosclerosis, habituation, and testicular atrophy as common side effects. 19 NCAA
indifference in the face of this potential harm could lead to the
continued or accelerated use of harmful drugs by athletes.
As the chief administrative body of American major college
athletics, 20 the NCAA has attempted to end the improper use of
14. The testing of a person's urine is one of the most commonly used
procedures to determine the presence of drugs in a person's body. Most
sports organizations, which test athletes for drug use, use some form of

urinalysis. See, e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MEDICAL GUIDE

23-30 (1984) (summary of testing procedure and banned substances). A discussion of the types of drug tests and the logistic and economic problems of
drug testing is outside the scope of this paper. For information on drug testing, see D. TENNENHOUSE, ArORNEY'S MEDICAL DESKBOOK §§ 110-118 (1983);
Neff, Caracas.A Scandal and a Warning, SPORTS ILLus., Sept. 5, 1983, at 18.
15. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 251-52 (statement of Dr. Donald Spencer, coordinator of the Medical Aspects of Sports Committee of the National
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics). A number of former athletes have
written books which chronicle the use of drugs in both college and professional sports. See, e.g., P. GENT, NORTH DALLAS FORTY (1973); D. MEGGYESEY, OUT OF THEIR LEAGUE (1970); B. PARISH, THEY CALL IT A GAME (1971).

16. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Dr. Cooper) (dangers
of amphetamines and steroids); 124-26 (statement of Dr. Golding) (dangers
of side effects caused by amphetamine and steroid use).
17. See supra note 11.
18. The death of one athlete, an Italian bicycle racer, was conclusively
linked to drug use during performance. The athlete's death was attributed
to a heart attack which was caused by amphetamines and heavy exertion.
The death spurred a reexamination of the use of drugs by European bicycle
racers culminating with the institution of mandatory drug testing. The tests
had a positive effect. Different agencies administering the tests all point to
at least a 20% drop in positive test results over a three-year period. See
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, DOPING 19-36 (1972) (published for the
1972 Olympic winter games).
19. See supranote 11.
20. The NCAA is an unincorporated association which consists of more
than 870 schools, conferences, and organizations. The membership consists
of both privately endowed and publicly funded schools, but over half of the
members are publicly supported. The Association is organized pursuant to
the NCAA Constitution. The NCAA monitors the integrity of each member's athletic program, promulgates rules of play governing inter-collegiate
sports, and organizes championship athletic events. In addition, it promul-
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drugs among college athletes. 21 In 1973 the NCAA adopted a bylaw which prohibited the use of dangerous drugs in NCAA
championship events and allowed the Executive Committee to
authorize methods for testing competitors in those events. 22 In
1975, the NCAA instituted a drug awareness program aimed at
gates stringent guidelines to achieve its stated objectives and policies. See
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 1, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETc AsSOCIATION 7 (1984) (purposes of the NCAA); Jones v. Wichita
State University, 698 F.2d 1082, 1083 (10th Cir. 1983). See also Cross, The
College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 151 (1974)
(general discussion of the role of the NCAA as the administrative body of
college athletics). See generally J. MICHENER, supra note 2, at 219-80; Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J.C. & U.L. 167, 169-71 (1983)
(critical discussion of NCAA's structure and monolithic control over college
sports) [hereinafter cited as Weistart, Legal Accountability].
The NCAA rules and guidelines are enforced by the Committee on Infractions. See OFFICIAL PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM § 1 (1984), reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssoCIATION, 1984-85 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
199-214 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM]. The
enforcement program is similar to those employed by governmental administrative agencies. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-576 (1980). The program envisions a two-step enforcement procedure including an investigative phase
and an adjudicatory phase. NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM §§ 1, 2, 12. During the investigative stage, the NCAA investigative staff, either on a member's complaint or on its own motion, will investigate the facts surrounding
any allegation of misconduct. Id. at § 2. If the Committee on Infractions
determines that a "violation of a serious nature" has occurred, then an official inquiry and finding of fact will be initiated by the Committee. Id. at § 3.

Upon the factual determinations of the official inquiry, the Committee shall
determine whether a violation has occurred and it shall issue findings of
fact and impose a penalty. Id. at § 4. All of the investigations must be con-

ducted according to the articulated policies and guidelines of the Enforcement Program. Id. at § 12.
The official inquiry consists of a hearing at which the school is allowed
to present evidence relevant to the issues of the inquiry. Id. at § 4(a)(1).

Penalties which may be imposed upon a finding of a serious violation are
listed in section 7 of the Enforcement Program. The penalties may be imposed upon the institution itself or against a student athlete. Id. at § 7. The
sanctioned institution has the right to appeal the finding of the Committee

on Infractions. Id. at § 5. Although the institution has the right to contest

the NCAA's allegations at the hearing and the right to appeal the finding of

the Committee on Infractions, student athletes are given very few proce-

dural rights. The assumption is that the member institution will adequately
represent the interests of the athlete. Id.
A number of commentators have criticized the NCAA enforcement procedure. The main point of attack has been the NCAA assumption that the

member institution will adequately represent the student athlete. See

Remington, NCAA Enforcement Procedures Including the Role of the Committee on Infractions,10 J.C. & U.L. 181 (1983); Weistart, Legal Accountability, supra 169-79. The problem with this assumption is that the school will
be interested in minimizing the risk of injuring its reputation with the
NCAA or the general public. Consequently, the school will not represent
the athlete's interest to the fullest. Weistart, Legal Accountability, supra,

at 175-80.
21. See supra note 20 and infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.

22. BYLAws AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, art. 5, § 2 (1984), reprintedin 1984-85 MANUAL OF THE NA-
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educating athletes, coaches, and athletic trainers about the detrimental effects of drug use in athletics. 23 Those measures, however, have had limited success as a means of controlling drug
24
use among athletes.
Many factors have hindered the NCAA's attempts to alleviate the drug problem. First, although the drug education program deters most athletes, the pressure on the athlete to
succeed in some cases may override the athlete's concern for his
own health. 25 Second, because the 1973 NCAA bylaw prohibited
drug use only at championship events, 26 it did not affect the majority of athletes. The NCAA Executive Committee, moreover,
did not implement a comprehensive drug testing plan even for
the championship events, thus there were no means to effectively enforce limited proscription against drug use.
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION 97 (1984). Section 2, entitled
"Drugs" states in pertinent part:
(a) Student-athletes competing in NCAA championships shall not use
any drugs which may endanger their health or safety. This does
not preclude the use of drugs prescribed by a physician in the
course of medical treatment.
(b) The Executive Committee may authorize methods for testing student-athletes who compete in NCAA championships to determine
the extent of drug usage therein.
Id.
By its own terms, the rule applies only to NCAA sanctioned championship events. Id. The rule discussed in this paper will include drug testing
for all NCAA sanctioned events. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the unenforceability of this rule, see infra text accompanying notes 27-29.
In addition, many NCAA member conferences have included anti-drug
clauses as part of the "Grant-in-Aid Tender Sheet" which is the scholarship
agreement signed by the school and the athlete. It sets forth several conditions with which the athlete must comply. The clause in the Big Ten Conference, Tender of Financial Assistance-Men, 1984-85, states that the
athletic scholarship "may not be renewed ... for participating in the use, sale
of, or distribution of any narcotic or controlled subtance." Big Ten Conference, Tender of Financial Assistance-Men Acceptance cl. f (1984).
23. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 43-109 (statement of Robert Pritchard,
Chairman NCAA Drug Education Committee) (testimony on NCAA drug
education program including posters and informative pamphlets and articles discouraging drug use by athletes). The drug awareness program consisted of lectures to teams and other athletic groups as well as a nationwide
advertising campaign decrying the use of drugs by athletes. Although the
drug awareness program is still in effect, the increasing number of athletes
who use drugs is indicative of the program's limited effectiveness. See
Hearings,supra note 1, at 10-14 (statements of Mr. Cooper).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29. See also supra note 1.
25. See supra notes 1-2.
26. See supranote 22. Championship events involve only the top caliber
athletes and teams who have successfully participated in the regular seasons. Cf. Bylaws and Interpretationsof the National CollegiateAthletic AsTIONAL

arts. 5-6, reprinted in MANuAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLEIc ASSOCIATION 83-110 (1984).

sociation

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:205

Because of the limited success of the NCAA's present antidrug programs, the NCAA needs a rule which both prohibits the
use of harmful drugs by all NCAA athletes and provides an effective means of enforcement. Without a means by which the
NCAA can identify athletes who are using drugs, the only fair
way for the NCAA to sanction an athlete's drug use is if the use
of the drug is witnessed or documented. 2 7 Consequently, the
rule will be enforceable only in limited situations, and will not
deter the use of drugs by athletes. A comprehensive drug testing program, similar to the program used by the International
Olympic Committee, 28 would give the NCAA the strong tool necessary to combat the use of controlled drugs by the college
29
athlete.
At its 1984 convention, the NCAA recognized the need for a
rule and testing program. 30 The convention delegates directed
the NCAA Executive Committee "to develop an ongoing program of drug testing to identify those students involved in intercollegiate athletics who have used either controlled or allegedly
performance-enhancing drugs" and to provide sanctions against
athletes who use drugs. 31 Although testing athletes for drugs is
a strict and authoritarian measure, the NCAA has determined
that testing is necessary to help end the use of performance enhancing drugs. 32 While this rule is necessary, it could be subject
27. An anti-drug rule, without a viable means of enforcement, acts only
as a deterrent. To invoke a penalty under such a rule without some concrete means of determining whether or not the athlete is using drugs would
be tantamount to considering a person guilty of a crime before a hearing.
28. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER rule 29
(1984). Rule 29 to the IOC Olympic Charter is the "Medical Code" of the
Olympic movement. The rule states in pertinent part:
A. Doping is forbidden. The IOC shall prepare a list of prohibited
drugs.
B. All Olympic competitors are liable to medical control and examination carried out in conformity with the rules of the IOC Medical
Commission.
C. Any Olympic competitor refusing to submit to a medical control or
examination or who is found guilty of doping shall be excluded.
If the Olympic competitor is a member of a team, the match, competition or event during which the infringement took place shall be

forfeited by that team....
D. Female competitors must comply with the prescribed tests for
femininity....
Id. The "IOC Medical Controls" brochure is a by-law to Rule 29. The Medical Controls brochure sets up the testing procedures, the list of prohibited
drugs, and the reasons certain drugs are prohibited. INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MEDICAL GUIDE 23-30 (1984).
29. See supra notes 11-19.
30. See supra notes 5-7.
31. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Res. 163 (1984 Convention). For the
full text of the resolution, see supra note 7.

32. See supra note 7.
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to a constitutional challenge. 33
PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF

NCAA

RULES AND

SANCTIONS
The threshold question in a constitutional claim is whether
the invaded right is a right protected by the Constitution. 34 Student athletes, who were found ineligible to participate in athletics by the NCAA, have challenged such a finding by relying on
the fourteenth amendment. 35 Although no student athlete has
challenged an NCAA rule on the ground that it was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, the intrusiveness of a drug testing
rule could open the door for such a challenge. 36 Any NCAA
promulgated drug-testing rule, therefore, must be drafted to
conform to the strictures of the Constitution.
The State Action Requirement
A cause of action under the fourteenth amendment exists
37
only if the alleged invasion can be considered a state action.
Although the fourteenth amendment restrains only state actions
which invade individual interests, 38 the United States Supreme
Court has expanded the concept of state action to include some
situations where a private actor is the primary cause of the deprivation. The Court has identified three distinct theories by
which it restricts private activities under the rubric of state action. First, a private organization may be subject to constitutional restraint by performing a traditional government
function.3 9 Second, the nature and the circumstances of a par33. See supra notes 8-10.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See supra notes 59-105.
36. See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of state action, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTTUrTIONAL LAW 497-525 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
The express terms of the fourteenth amendment provide that no state
shall deprive a person of certain fundamental rights. U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. Initially, the state action requirement was interpreted strictly to
apply to direct actions by the states. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). The court, however, expanded the state action concept in a number
of racial discrimination cases. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Some Commentators have criticized
the expansion of state action. See, e.g., Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347 (1963); Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying
ConstitutionalRestrictions to PrivateActivity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
38. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
39. This private assumption of a power usually reserved for the government is commonly referred to as the "public function" theory or the "government function" theory. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(alternate ground for holding that a private park was subject to the fourteenth amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (owners of pri-
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ticular private action may reveal a substantial governmental involvement or entanglement in that activity so that it constitutes
a state action. 40 Finally, where the state controls the actions of a
private actor, those actions are considered the state's responsibility. 4 1 Although the NCAA is not a governmental body, it has

been held to be a state actor under both the "governmental function" theory and the "entanglement" theory. 42
vately owned company town are state actors because they serve a public
function). For a general discussion of this theory, see NOWAK, supranote
37, at 502-08; Note, supra note 37, at 691-98.
40. This is referred to as the "entanglement" theory because it depends
upon mutual contacts between the state and the private individual. The
theory relies on the assumption that substantial contacts between the state
and the private actor render the private actions indistinguishable from
those of the state. The Court has not developed a special test to determine
the measure of involvement necessary to attribute private actions to the
state. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
(privately owned restaurant leasing space in state parking lot satisfies fourteenth amendment state action requirement). See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (book loan program involved state in private
school). Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (discussion of tax exemption to church as substantial government involvement). See generally
NOWAK, supra note 37, at 513-23; Note, supra note 37, at 663-90.
The types of state involvement necessary for a finding of state action
vary. The Court has discussed many different types of involvement in
reaching determinations on state action issues. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967) (government protection of a preexisting right); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (state aid to schools); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (government regulation of private actor).
41. This theory is usually referred to as the "state control" or "state encouragement" theory. This theory is very similar to the "entanglement"
theory. See supra note 40. In both theories, the courts look at the factual
background of each case to determine whether the involvement in control is
substantial enough to attribute the private actions to the state. See NOWAK,
supra note 37, at 508. In fact, NCAA decisions which have relied upon the
"entanglement" theory seem to discuss both the "entanglement" and "state
control" theories without distinguishing between the two. See, e.g., Howard
Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a general discussion of the
"state control" or "state encouragement" theory, see NOWAK, supranote 37,
at 508-13; Note, supra note 37, at 508-13, 663-90.
42. See Rivas Tenerio v. Liga Athletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492,
494-96 (1st Cir. 1977) (entanglement theory used to find state action in Puerto Rican equivalent of the NCAA); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136,
1144 (5th Cir. 1977) (entanglement theory); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v.
NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 364-65 (8th Cir.) (entanglement theory), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 978 (1977); Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976) (entanglement theory); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 216-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(entanglement theory); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (5th Cir.
1975) (state control theory); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d
1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1974) (state control theory).
The state action issue in the context of a constitutional challenge or an
NCAA rule or sanction poses an interesting problem for the courts. The
reviewing courts have held that the actions of a publicly funded college or
university are clearly state actions. See Dixon v. Board. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,368 U.S. 930 (1961); Dutram v. Pulsifier, 312
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In Parishv. NCAA, 43 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the NCAA activities constituted state action because the NCAA performed a traditional governmental
function.44 Noting the traditional governmental interest in all
aspects of education and the national scope of college athletics,
the court determined that there was a need for an organization
F. Supp. 411 (D. Utah. 1970). Private colleges or universities, however, are
usually not considered state actors. Historically, when both public and private institutions are members of an athletic association, courts have not
found state action. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); California State-Hayward v. NCAA, 47
Cal. App. 3d 533, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1978). In the past, courts viewed the
NCAA as a private association consisting of a voluntary membership. Accordingly, the courts applied the "doctrine of private associations" to the
NCAA and similar athletic associations. See California State-Hayward v.
NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1978); Bunger v. Iowa High
School Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972). Under the doctrine of
private association, members who voluntarily join an association subject
themselves to the rules of the association. The courts have traditionally not
intervened into the inner workings of private associations unless the rules
made by the association are illegal or violative of public policy. See Parsons
College v. North Cent. Ass'n. of Colleges, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
Thus, the courts applied a low level of scrutiny to the private associations'
rules looking only to see whether the rules were consonant with law and
public policy, and whether the associations applied the rules without fraud.
See Goldstein, The Scope and School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct on Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 177 U. PA. L. REV. 373
(1969).
Changes in private associations have led to the imposition of a stricter
standard of scrutiny for private association determination. The courts impose a stricter standard when membership in a particular association is tantamount to a condition for participation in a particular field or concern. See
Falcone v. Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961); Note, Developments in the Law--Judicial Control ofActions of PrivateAssociations,
76 HARv. L. REV. 983 (1963) (judicial acknowledgement of the non-voluntariness of membership). See also J. WEISTART & C. LoWEL-, supra note 10, at
911-13. The stricter scrutiny simply means that a court will review private
association rules to see if they are reasonable and applied fairly.
The NCAA's pervasive control of college athletics will subject it to the
stricter private association scrutiny. Participation in the NCAA is a virtual
prerequisite for a university which wishes to compete in college athletics.
Moreover, the athletes themselves do not voluntarily subject themselves to
the rules of the NCAA. They simply go to a college that is a member, thus
binding themselves to the rules. The proposed rule will be drafted to pass
the stricter constitutional test. Thus, the rule will also survive judicial review under the strictest private association scrutiny.
43. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975). In Parish,basketball players at Centenary University sought injunctive relief to prohibit the NCAA from declaring them ineligible to compete in NCAA tournaments or in NCAA
sanctioned television games. Id. at 1031. The NCAA had declared the players ineligible for not maintaining a 1.6 grade point average during their
freshman year. Accordingly, the NCAA directed the small private school to
terminate the athletes' scholarships. Upon Centenary's refusal to comply
with the NCAA rule, it was declared ineligible for tournament or television

competition. Id. at 1030-31.
44. Id. at 1031-33.
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to control and direct college athletics. 45 Because this control
was beyond the means of any single state, the court concluded
that the NCAA, by filling the void, performed a governmental
function. 46 The Parish court stated that "it would be a strange
doctrine indeed to hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitution by banding together
to form or to support a 'private' organization to which they have
relinquished some portion of their governmental power. '47 The
48
United States Supreme Court, in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
narrowed the applicability of the "governmental function" theory by requiring that the private actor completely displace the
governmental body for the state action to exist. 49 The reasoning
in Parish appears to retain its validity, however, because the
NCAA, which is the sole body controlling college athletics, does
50
completely displace the government.
The courts have also held, however, that NCAA activities
constitute a state action under the "entanglement" theory.5 ' In
Howard University v. NCAA, 52 the court weighed the involvement of state institutions in the NCAA's activities.5 3 Although
state or federally supported institutions comprise one-half of
the NCAA's membership, these schools contribute most of the
NCAA's capital and exercise substantial control over both
NCAA policy and action. 54 In addition, the NCAA provides
many valuable services to both state supported and privately
endowed member institutions.5 5 The Howard court decided
that the entanglement between the NCAA and its public institution members formed "the type of symbiotic relationship be45. Id.
46. Id. at 1033. The court reasoned that the government would fill the
void if the NCAA could no longer function as the coordinator of major college athletes in America. Id.
47. Id.
48. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
49. Id. at 155. See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, on remand, 531

F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. See J. MICHENER, supra note 2, at 251.
51. See supra note 40.

52. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Howard,a private university and an

athlete challenged three NCAA rules on the grounds that the rules and the
NCAA's enforcement violated the athlete's fourteenth amendment rights.
Id. at 214-16.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 219. The Howard court determined that "public instrumentalities" provided the majority of the NCAA governing Council which runs the
body throughout the year. The court also noted that large public institutions provided the most financial support for the NCAA because membership dues were levied according to the size of the member institutions. Id.
at 219-20.
55. Id. at 220.
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tween public and private entities which triggers constitutional
'56
scrutiny.
Under either the "entanglement" theory or the "governmental function" theory, courts facing the issue of whether an NCAA
action is a state actor can rely upon a substantial body of precedent to find a state action. 57 Therefore, in the context of a constitutional challenge to a drug-testing rule, the courts should
find that the NCAA is a state actor. As a state actor, the NCAA
is tantamount to a governmental administrative agency. It is
thus bound by the same equal protection and 8due process re5
quirements that bind administrative agencies.
Equal Protection
Student-athletes challenging the constitutionality of a drug
testing rule may claim that the rule denies them equal protection under the law.5 9 Courts faced with a student-athlete equal
protection challenge of NCAA rules have consistently applied
two standards of review: "strict scrutiny" 60 and "traditional
56. The court reached this conclusion by noting that public institutions
both controlled the NCAA and benefited from NCAA activities. Id.
57. See supra note 42.
58. See generally Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimism Forum, 75 COLuM. L. REV. 721
(1975); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1977).
59. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amindment states
that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdictions the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Courts determine
whether a governmental classification impermissibly differentiates without
a sufficient purpose between classes of persons. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971); NOWAK, supra note 37, at 586-600. A law may create an impermissible classification either "on its face," see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), or "in its application," see Yjck Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In addition, the legislative classification may
violate the equal protection clause if it is overinclusive or u nderinclusive.
An overinclusive legislative classification includes persons in addition to
those who are similarly situated with respect to the law, while an underinclusive classification excludes persons or groups who are similar to the included persons respect to the law. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 488-90 (1955); Developments, supra, 1083-87.
60. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). This strict standard applies when the challenged rule affects either
a "suspect classification," (see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1974)
(race a suspect class); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (suspect class
based on alienage); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (wealth as a
suspect classification); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)), or a
"fundamental interest," (see, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (a
right to be a candidate); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 320 (1972) (right to
vote and right to travel); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (no fundamental right to governmental subsidized housing); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958) (right to travel abroad); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1954) (procedural rights for accused criminals); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
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equal protection."' 61 Courts have
found the NCAA rules consti62
tutional under both standards.
Courts have found the strict scrutiny standard inapplicable,
however, to disputes between athletes and the NCAA. 63 Neither
(1942) (right to procreate)). But see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (no fundamental right to subsistence or welfare payments). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
The strict scrutiny standard, sometimes called the new equal protection, is actually forty years old. The phrase was first used in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The new equal protection standard is
stricter because the Court decided that the political process could not adequately protect certain interests. See United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976). Consequently, the
Court began to assert more power over legislative classifications in certain
situations. See Developments, supra note 59, at 1065-80. The Court increasingly decides equal protection by applying a middle-tier test. Under this
test, a challenged classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This middle-tier allows the Court to
review certain classifications more strictly without creating new fundamental interests or suspect classes. The Court has applied this middle level of
scrutiny to gender discrimination cases. See Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins.
Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of the middle-tier standard of scrutiny, see Gunther, In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standardsof Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral,and Permissive Classification,62 GEO.
L.J. 1071 (1974).
61. Regulations which do not affect a fundamental interest or a suspect
class are subject to the more lenient "traditional equal protection standards." Under this standard of scrutiny, the challenged regulation must
simply bear a rational relationship to legitimate state interests to survive
the equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979)
(mandatory retirement rule upheld under the rational relationship test);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory
retirement rule rationally related to state's objective). The Court traditionally scrutinizes economic and social welfare legislation under this lower
level of scrutiny if the challenged classification does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class. This lower standard is satisfied if any conceivable set of facts can establish a rational relationship between the
classification and an arguably legitimate end of the government. See
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1980) (welfare benefits); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (property use); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (business activity); Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (personal activity). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); NowAK, supra note 37, at 593-600; Gunther,
supra note 60; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal ProtectionClause
and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
62. See infra notes 63-73.
63. See Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082, 1086 (10th Cir. 1983)
(dictum) (claimant conceded that strict scrutiny standard was not applicable); Wiley v. NCAA, 612 F.2d 473, 480 (10th Cir. 1979) (Logan, J., dissenting)
(rational relationship test should be applied), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943
(1980); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1977) (minimum
rationality standard should apply); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th
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an athlete's right to an education nor the prospect of a professional athletic career have been deemed a "fundamental interest. '64
Similarly, the courts have determined that the
challenged NCAA rules did not discriminate against a suspect
class. 65 Typical claims against a rule, such as the minimum
grade point rule, 66 have not been found to create a suspect classification even though the rule may weigh more heavily upon
underprivileged athletes who did not benefit from a good high
school education. 67 In the only successful suit brought by an
athlete against the NCAA, however, the court determined that
an NCAA rule, which limited the eligibility of Canadian hockey
players, created a suspect classification because it affected cer68
tain Canadian student athletes unfairly.
In the majority of equal protection claims brought against
the NCAA, the courts have also upheld the challenged rules by
finding that they were rationally related to legitimate state interCir. 1975) (challenged rule not subject to strict scrutiny); Associated Students v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally Martin, supra
note 10, at 369-99; Comment, ConstitutionalDimension,supranote 10, at 33336; Note, Judicial Review, supra note 10, at 424-28.
64. See, e.g., Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir.
1973) (classification by sex is subject to scrutiny under 14th amendment);
Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1970) (rule that any person who repeats a grade after the 6th grade shall
lose his 4th year of eligibility was not an encroachment of a fundamental
right); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976) (student hockey player's interest in participating in school athletics did not rise
to level of constitutionally protected property or liberty interest), affid, 570
F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
65. But see, e.g., Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973)
(only case which found that NCAA discriminated against suspect class).
66. See Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, art. 5, § 1, reprinted in 1984-85 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION 83-97. The minimum grade point rule is actually a series of rules covering almost every aspect of the academic related
eligibility of the NCAA athlete. Id.
67. See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1975) (rule limited eligibility for scholarship and participation in athletics to those who
maintain a 1.600 grade point average during their first year in college); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1974) (1.600
Rule). Although generalized rules may produce irrational results at times,
under the traditional equal protection scrutiny those rules are consonant
with equal protection. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(subjecting opticians to regulation while exempting sellers of ready-to-wear
eyeglasses from some regulation did not violate equal protection).
68. Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973). See also Rivas
Tenero v. Liga Athletica Interuniversatoria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977) (regulation should have been subject to strict scrutiny because of its facial discrimination against aliens); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (association's "foreign-student" rule created an unconstitutional
alienage classification).
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ests. 69 In Jones v. Wichita State University,70 a student-athlete

contested the NCAA's 2.000 minimum grade point rule which
prohibited NCAA institutions from awarding scholarships to incoming athletes who had accumulated less than a 2.000 grade
point average in high school. 71 The athlete contended that the
variance in high school grade computation resulted "in a disparate and unequal application of the 2.000 rule, thereby causing
prospective student-athletes to be treated in a discriminatory
manner." 72 In applying the rational relationship test, the court
determined that the rule was rationally related to a legitimate
73
state interest, and thus was constitutional.
The rational relationship test establishes a very low burden
of proof for the NCAA rule makers. In fact, only one court has
found an NCAA rule unconstitutional on the ground that it denied athletes equal protection under the law.74 In addition to
the athletes' equal protection arguments, a drug-testing rule
may affect other constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy or the right to due process.
ProceduralDue Process
The Student Athlete's Protectible Interests
A student athlete may also challenge a drug-testing rule
75
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
69. See Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082, 1086-88 (10th Cir.
1983) (dictum) (claimant conceded that strict scrutiny standard not applicable and court found legitimate state interest in preventing exploitation of
the student-athlete); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (distinction between coaches who had academic tenure and those who did not
was rationally related to legitimate economic interests of college athletic
program); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976)
(rule rendering as ineligible hockey players who had played for pay rationally related to interest of protecting athletes from exploitation even though
it bore more heavily on some nationalities), affd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1978). But see Wiley v. NCAA, 612 F.2d 473, 478 (10th Cir. 1979) (Logan, C.J.,
dissenting) (rule preventing student-athlete from receiving Basic Equal
Opportunity Grant totally arbitrary with respect to state interest of
preventing exploitation of athlete because university has no control over
awarding of the BEOG's), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980). See generally J.
WEISTART & C. JOWELL, supra note 10, at 49-50; Carrafiello, supra note 10;
Gaona, supra note 10, at 1091-95; Martin, supranote 10, at 393-400; Comment,
Amateurism, supra note 10, at 600-12; Comment, ConstitutionalDimensions,
supra note 10, at 334-40; Note, JudicialReview, supra note 10, at 916-20.
70. 698 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1983).
71. Id. at 1083-84.
72. Id. at 1086.
73. Id. at 1087.
74. See supra note 68.
75. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 368 (8th
Cir.) (student-athletes not entitled to considerations of mitigating circumstances in connection with violations of NCAA constitution and bylaws
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This clause requires that due process of law be accorded to an
individual whenever state actions deprive that individual "of
life, liberty or property. '76 Under a due process theory, the student athlete would attempt to have the NCAA sanction, as opposed to the rule, declared unconstitutional. 77 Under this theory,
the athlete would contest the NCAA determination on the
ground that it deprived him of a constitutionally protected right
without affording him rudimentary procedural safeguards. 78
The NCAA affords sanctioned athletes few procedural
rights. 79 The courts, however, have not been receptive to the
athlete's due process claims. 80 Athletes have been unable to
prove that the NCAA sanctions deprive them of an interest to
which due process rights attach. 81 The threshold question in
any due process claim is whether the state has deprived the
claimant of a right which falls under the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of "life, liberty or property. '82 The Court
has broadly interpreted the protected rights to include many
prior to declaration of their ineligibility), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977);
Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (private college and
student disqualified under rules of NCAA from participating in Association's sporting events were not denied due process of law because they
were given notice of charges against them); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA,
417 F. Supp. 885, 893-95 (D. Colo. 1976) (court precluded from addressing
due process issue), affid, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1980). See also Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1145-47 (5th Cir. 1977) (procedure for passage of NCAA
bylaw adequately protected coaches who lost job because of rule); Williams
v. Hamilton, 497 F. Supp. 641, 644-46 (D.N.H. 1980) (student did not have a
property interest in participation); Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F.
Supp. 920, 929-34 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (procedure by which conference could
"black ball" a coach for a violation of NCAA rules was enjoined until the
conference outlined a procedure comporting with due process). See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at § 1.15; Carrafiello, supra
note 10; Gaona, supra note 10, at 1096-1101; Martin, supra note 10, at 393-400;
Comment, Amateurism, supra note 10, at 612-22; Note, Judicial Review,
supra note 10, at 921-24.
76. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (court must
look not at the weight of the interest at stake but at the nature of the interest at stake); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will suffer grevious loss). See generallyNOWAK, supra note 37, at ch. 15; Simon, Liberty and
Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 146 (1983).
77. See NOWAK, supra note 37, at ch. 15.
78. See supra note 75.
79. See supra note 20.
80. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text. See also supra note
75.
81. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text. See also supra note
72.
82. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); NOWAK, supranote 37, at 527. The fourteenth amendment, by its own
terms, limits the due process requirement to state deprivations of life, lib-
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Student athletes alleging that

they were deprived of a protected right without due process
have claimed to have a property interest in their continued participation. In Board of Regents v. Roth,84 the Court held that a
property interest exists in a benefit only if the claimant demonstrates a legitimate claim of entitlement and not just an abstract
or unilateral desire for the benefit. 85
Student athletes have advanced three arguments to prove
that an NCAA sanction deprived them of a protectible property
interest under Roth and its progeny. First, their participation is
protectible as an integral facet of their education. 86 Second,
their athletic scholarship creates a protectible contract interest.8 7 Third, the NCAA sanction would foreclose the economic

opportunities of professional athletics. 88 Judicial receptiveness
to each of these arguments has varied.
Athletes contending that the right to participate in athletics
is protectible as a facet of education have argued for a broad interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez.89
erty or property: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83. While the "life" interest is self-explanatory, the Court interpreted
the interests of "liberty" and "property" to include a wide range of factual
situations. Although the Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, (1976),
concluded that a claimant must show a "tangible" interest in liberty before
due process rights are invoked, the Court has decided that some of these
tangible liberty interests include: discharging plaintiff from governmental
employment, Arnatt v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, (1974); barring the plaintiff
from future governmental employment, Joint Anti-Fascit Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, (1951); suspension of a student from a public school,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Court also stated that the liberty
interest includes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
84. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
85. Id. at 577.
86. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158, 1161
(D. Minn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,560 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 978 (1977). For a discussion of judicial receptiveness to this argument, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
87. See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975); Colorado
Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo.), afd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th
Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this argument, see infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972). But see Parish v. NCAA, 506
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975). See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
89. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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In Goss, the Court held that a student's right to a public education may not be abridged without due process of law. 90 In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. NCAA, 91 moreover, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied on Goss and held
that the character-building function of competitive athletics was
integral to the athlete's educational experience and thus protectible under the due process clause. 92 Although other courts
have adopted a narrower interpretation of Goss, the reasoning of
Regents of the University of Minnesota provides a strong precedent for the application of due process principles to NCAA de93
terminations of an athlete's eligibility.
An athlete contesting an NCAA sanction may also contend
that he has a constitutionally protected property right in the
94
contractual relationship created by the athletic scholarship.
For instance, in Perry v. Sinderman,95 the United States
Supreme Court held that a non-tenured college professor may
90. In Goss, students who were suspended from school contended that
they should be granted at least rudimentary procedural safeguards. The
Court found that the students must be given due process protection because a student has a "legitimate entitlement to public education." Id. at
574.
91. 422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,560 F.2d 32
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 978 (1977).
92. The University of Minnesota brought this action seeking injunctive
relief from an NCAA sanction. Id. The University incurred the sanction as
a result of its failure to comply with the NCAA's order to declare three basketball players ineligible for selling complimentary tickets. Id. For cases
adopting a more narrow view of Goss, see Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028,
1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895
(D. Colo.), affid, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1976); NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d
1072, 1082 (Miss. 1977).
93. Athletics may be one of the single most compelling reasons for an
athlete to attend a higher educational institution. Richard Rohberg, a noted
sports sociologist, has stated that:
Contrary to the belief that athletics is detrimental to scholastic performance and educational expectations, the evidence we have reviewed
appears to support the belief that interscholastic athletics is conducive
not only to higher scholastic performance but to higher educational expectations as well. (That is, sports encourage high school students to
continue their education.)
J. MICHENER, supra note 2, at 301 (1976).
94. See, e.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo.
1976), aftd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978). See generally Gaona, supranote 10,
at 1094-95; Comment, Amateurism, supra note 10, at 615-18; Comment, Constitutional Dimension, supra note 10, at 336-40.
95. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The professor, in Perry,was employed at a small
private college which did not have a tenure plan. Odessa College, the employer, instead had a policy giving the professors "permanent tenure." According to the official policy of the college, tenure could be revoked only if
the teacher became uncooperative, performed unsatisfactorily, or was unhappy in the position. Id. at 600. Contra Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972) (professor hired for fixed term of one year does not have property
interest in continued employment).
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have a property interest in reemployment if the circumstances
and conduct of the parties created a "mutually explicit understanding" of reemployment. 96 While an NCAA sanctioned athletic scholarship technically must be renewed on a yearly
basis, 97 an athlete could argue that the scholarship relationship
creates the "mutually explicit understanding" envisaged in
Perry.98 The athlete would argue that the factors surrounding
the school's offer and the athlete's acceptance of the scholarship
created a "mutually explicit understanding" that the scholarship was intended to last for four years.9 9 The large amount of
time and money spent in the modern recruitment process bolsters the athletes argument that the scholarship is viewed as a
four-year investment.
Student athletes have also argued that they have an economic interest in participation in college athletics which cannot
be taken away without due process. 10 0 The athletes contend
96. Perry, 408 U.S. at 603.
97. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 4(g), reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssocIATION 19 (1984).
98. 408 U.S. at 603. Courts, however, have looked more skeptically upon
this argument. See, e.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D.
Colo. 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978). The Colorado Seminary court
rejected the argument that an athlete had a property interest in a continued
athletic scholarship and place on the athletic team. Id. at 894-95. The court
took a narrow view of Roth and held that the athlete's interest in the scholarship was too speculative to deserve due process protection. Id. at 895 n.5
(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). The court reasoned
that a scholarship athlete had no more reason to expect a place on the team
than any other student at the university. Id.
99. The NCAA has placed limits on the number of scholarships that a
school may award each year. College athletic programs spend a great deal
of time and money to recruit the best athletes for scholarships. Considering
the substantial investment made by the schools, it is fair to assume that the
schools intend that the athlete will serve them for four years. The athlete,
on the other hand, usually sifts through a number of scholarship offers using various factors to choose the correct school. When the athletes make
the choice to the exclusion of other schools, they make it on the assumption
that they will spend their college careers at the particular school. Because
both the school and the athlete view the scholarship as a four year investment, there is a mutually explicit understanding that the scholarship will
continue for four years. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). For a general discussion of the athlete and the athletic recruitment process, see J.
MICHENER, supra note 2, at 52-60, 247-52; Cross, The College Athlete and the
Institution, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153-57 (1973).
100. See Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982) (student granted preliminary injunction because there was substantial
probability of success on his due process claim); Regent of the Univ. of
Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,560
F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977) (opportunity to participate in intercollegiate basketball a property right entitled to due process
guarantees); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976),
affid, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (student's interest in participating in intercollegiate athletics did not rise to level of constitutionally protected
property interest); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Repre-
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that a determination of ineligibility would foreclose their opportunity for lucrative professional sports contracts or other longterm benefits of the college athletic experience. 10 1 In Behagen v.
Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives,10 2 the
court held that a college athlete could not be suspended from
intercollegiate competition without the minimum standards of
due process. 10 3 The court determined that "to many [athletes]
the chance to display their athletic prowess in college stadiums
and arenas throughout the country is worth more in economic
terms than the chance to get a college education."' 0 4 The
Behagen holding, however, does not represent the majority view
and has not been followed by other courts. 05
The Process That Should Be Due
Notwithstanding the limited judicial acknowledgement of
the athlete's economic interest in a future professional career,
athletes do have a valid argument for due process rights in the
NCAA enforcement process. Because a student athlete may
possess a protectible interest in continued athletic eligibility, 0 6
sentatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1976) (conference decision reached
without a hearing deprived the athletes of their constitutional right to due
process). But cf.Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975)
("appellants wisely abandoned ...
their attempt to create a property interest
out of ...
their hoped for careers in professional basketball"). Athletes wishing to play professional athletics are fighting great odds. In J. MICHENER,
supra note 2, the author discussed the odds against a high school basketball
player making a professional team:
In a physical year there will be 200,000 school boy seniors eager to win
basketball scholarships at some college, but since there are only 1,243
colleges playing the game, the scholarships available cannot exceed
12,000. Four years later the colleges will be graduating about 5,700 seniors, most of them hoping for a professional contract. But there are
only 25 professional teams, and they draft somewhere around 200 players each year, but they actually offer contracts to only a portion of that
number. About 55 college seniors will land salaried berths with the
pros, but of them only about six of them will earn starting positions.
Id. at 193.
101. But see supra note 100 (athletes have limited professional
opportunity).
102. 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972).
103. Id. at 605.
104. Id. at 604.

105. Many courts have viewed the athlete's interest in a professional
sports career as too speculative to invoke procedural safeguards. E.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976) (following a strict
interpretation of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), affd, 570 F.2d
320 (10th Cir. 1978). Some commentators have suggested that the athlete's
interest in a professional career may deserve due process protection. Carrafiello, supra note 10, at 860-62; Comment, Amateurism, supra note 10, at
620-22.
106. For a discussion of the athlete's valid interest, see supra notes 75-105
and accompanying text.
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he is entitled to the minimal procedural standards the constitution requires before the athlete can be denied athletic
0 7
eligibility.
In

Matthews v. Eldridge,10 8 the United States Supreme

Court developed a balancing test to decide the procedures that
must be followed before the government can act to deprive a
person of a protected interest. 10 9 The Court identified three factors in making the determination:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requisites would entail.' 10
Applying these factors, the NCAA must provide certain procedural safeguards to protect the student athletes from the erroneous deprivation of their interest in continued participation in
college athletics."' Because the athlete's interest is relatively
insubstantial when compared to a welfare recipient's interest in
continued subsistence payments, only minimal safeguards are
necessary. The additional burden that a mass drug-testing rule
will cause the NCAA is relatively small." 2 While the athletic
scholarship is technically not a four-year commitment on the
107.
mined
due");
108.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[o]nce it is deterthat due process applies, the question remains what process is
NowAK, supra note 37, at 554-62.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).

109. Id. at 335.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supranote 1. See NOwAK, supra note 37, at 560-62. Two cases are
of particular importance in the context of a due process-based challenge of

an NCAA sanction. See Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920
(W.D. Mo. 1978); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972). The Stanley court held that the
sanctioned parties were entitled to challenge the NCAA action in hearings
and to be informed in writing of the charges against them, the grounds for
the sanction, and a list of witnesses at least two days before the hearings.
463 F. Supp. at 932-33. The Behagen court reached a similar result. 346 F.
Supp. at 607-08. At the hearing, the parties were entitled to present their
position, to hear all of the evidence, and to receive a tape recording of the
proceedings. Stanley, 463 F. Supp. at 932-33; Behagen, 346 F. Supp. at 608. In
addition, the Stanley court held that the sanctioned party had the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 463 F. Supp. at 932-33. For a list of other
procedural rights which have been granted to athletes facing athletic association sanctions, see Martin, supra note 10, at 401 n.85.
The NCAA has recently come under judicial fire because of its pervasive control of college athletics. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Oklahoma, 52 U.S.L.W. 4928 (June 27, 1984), the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA's pervasive control over television rights to college football violated the Sherman Act. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted

19841

Drug Testing Rule

part of the NCAA member school, current logistical and practical factors indicate that athletes have an interest in the continuance of their scholarship and participation for four years. 113 In
addition, the obvious differences between a drug-testing rule
and typical NCAA rules 1 4 also militate in favor of according
minimal due process rights. Any drug-testing rule promulgated
by the NCAA should include minimal procedural safeguards in
order to survive a constitutional challenge.
Right To Privacy
In addition to equal protection and due process challenges,
student athletes challenging a drug-testing rule may also contend that the drug test invades their constitutional right of privacy." 5 This right of privacy, however, has been applied only in
limited factual situations. 1 6 There is a dearth of case law on the
that, in some ways, "the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the
place of intercollegiate athletics in the nation's life...."
113. See supra notes 75-105 and accompanying text (discussion of athlete's due process arguments).
114. See supra note 20 (NCAA role and rules).
115. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized the right. See NOWAK, supra note
37, at 624-35, 787-89, 843; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965).
In Griswold, Justice Douglas wrote that the "specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees"
which provide individuals the right to engage in private acts free from governmental decisions. Id. at 484. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (Court invalidated a law which restricted right of poor people to
marry under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Court invalidated anti-abortion law on the
ground that it violated the due process clause of fourteenth amendment as
an unjust deprivation of liberty in that it unnecessarily infringed on a women's right to privacy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents have the right to send their children to parochial schools); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (private schools have right to be free from
excessive restrictions).
116. The Court has applied the right of privacy to areas concerning the
family. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking a law which interfered with the right to marry); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (allowing a non-pharmacist to sell non-medical contraceptive devices); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating a
law which required a spouse's consent to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 495 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating a law which prohibited unmarried persons from obtaining
contraceptives); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (upholding the
freedom of choice regarding the dissolution of marriage based solely on the
individual's inability to pay court costs and fees); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (allowing person to use contraceptives). While the Court
extended the right to privacy in these cases, it has refused to extend it to a
number of other situations. See, e.g., Enslin v. Bean, 436 U.S. 912 (1978)
(memorandum order) (refusing review of sodomy conviction of consenting
homosexual adult); Gay Liberation v. University of Mo. C., 558 F.2d 848 (8th
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issue of whether a person has a right to be free from drug testing. 117 Although the courts have authorized blood and urine
tests to determine whether drivers are under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, 118 those tests have been justified on the ground
that they are necessary to protect the safety of the general public. 119 The NCAA, however, would promulgate a drug rule to
protect the health of the users themselves.
One court has reviewed, on privacy grounds, the constitutionality of a drug-use questionnaire administered by school officials to eighth graders to isolate potential abusers. 20 In
Merriken v. Cressman,12 1 the court held that, by requiring students to take a personality test to reveal potential drug abusers,
Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom., Ratchford v. Gay Liberation, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978) (denying gay person's rights on campus).
117. An intrusive testing measure like a drug test may, however, be analogized to the fourth amendment dog sniffing cases. See, e.g., Jones v. Laxeto
Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Gardner, Sniffing
for Drugs in the Classroom, Perspective on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 803 (1980). Both searches involve an intrusive method to
search for drugs. Both methods of searching for drugs can be employed in
the school setting. Most of the drug sniff searches to date, however, have
been performed in grammar schools or high schools. They are distinguishable because the lower schools operate in loco parentis to the students.
Gardner, supra, at 811-31.
A mass drug screening through urinalysis would most likely be a fourth
amendment search. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood
test is a search under fourth amendment). Two factors, however, render a
complete fourth amendment discussion unnecessary. First, the regularity
and certainty of a mandatory drug test should establish a predictable and
guided regulatory presence which "provides a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant." Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). Thus,
a rule which provides for regular testing at specific times would satisfy the
fourth amendment's proscription against warrantless searches. Secondly,
the athlete may waive the right to be free from a drug test. An authorized
and voluntary consent will validate a search which would otherwise be illegal. See State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
947 (1970). The NCAA should not attempt a mass drug-testing program
without first seeking an informed consent from the athletes. This is especially true in light of the Court's reluctance to accept the waiver of constitutional rights. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. The Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292,
304 (1937) (no compromise because of expediency); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (courts give every reasonable presumption
against waiver).
118. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
119. Id. at 764.
120. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
121. Id. In Merriken, a junior high school attempted to introduce a drug
abuse program to be administered to eighth graders at a local school. The
program consisted of a drug-use questionnaire which was aimed at identifying potential drug abusers and preparing the programs by which drug
abuse control could be prevented. While most of the questions were vague,
many of the questions sought to elicit answers relating to the home life of
the subject. After compiling all of the answers, the program administrators
planned to develop a data bank for the dissemination of the information to
persons associated with the school. Id. at 914-17.
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the school administrators had violated the students' right to privacy. 122 The Merriken court upheld the students' privacy rights
because many of the test questions intruded into their private
123
family relationships.
Because the Supreme Court has only upheld privacy rights
in limited factual situations, generally dealing with familial relations, 124 it is unlikely that a student athlete would succeed in a
privacy-based challenge to a drug-testing rule. 125 In addition,
the right of privacy, like other constitutional rights, may be voluntarily waived. 126 Therefore, an athlete may waive the right by
voluntarily and knowingly subjecting himself to the test.

A PROPOSED DRUG TESTING RULE
The NCAA can draft a drug-testing rule that will withstand
constitutional scrutiny in the courts. Initially, the rule must set
forth the purposes and objectives which it seeks to serve. The
primary purpose of a drug-testing rule is to protect the health of
the student athlete. 27 The state has a legitimate concern for the
health of its citizens. 28 The regulations of the Food and Drug
122. Id. at 922. The questionaire included questions of a highly personal
nature which went "directly to an individual's family relationship and his
rearing." Id. at 918. The Merriken court concluded that it could "look upon
any invasion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's Constitutional
right of privacy." Id. In concluding that the test violated the student's right
to privacy, the Merriken court also addressed the consent issue. Id. at 919.
The court concluded that there was no valid consent because the waiver
form was a mere "selling tool" for the test and did not include the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences of the program. Id.
123. Id. at 922.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussion of the right to
privacy and the United States Supreme Court).
126. A person may voluntarily waive his constitutional rights with a
knowing consent. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the
Court stated that "[w] aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of
relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id. at 748.
127. See supra notes 1, 11, 15 and accompanying text (discussion of harmful side effects of drug use and also of NCAA's purpose for past drug plans).
128. The Supreme Court's decision in many commerce clause cases
turned on the issue of whether the state exercised a local police power,
such as regulating the health of its citizens. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (state asserted that it had the
power to regulate milk for legitimate health and safety reasons); Bradley v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (state could refuse new truck traffic
as a legitimate means of protecting local health). Under the equal protection clause, various courts have upheld a wide variety of state interests.
See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App.
618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973) (preventing litter and waste); Black Hills Packing
Co. v. South Dakota Stockgrowers Ass'n, 397 F. Supp. 622 (D.S.D. 1975) (protecting health through meat regulations).
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Administration 129 and the criminal laws 130 against drugs manifest the state's interest in the public health, especially where
drugs are concerned.
The NCAA promulgates many rules for the express purpose
of protecting student athletes from physical harm during their
athlete participation. 13 1 Most of these rules prohibit athletes
from certain movements or actions which have been proved to
be dangerous. 132 A drug-testing rule is a logical extension of
these rules. The drug-testing rule, like the other rules, is aimed
at protecting athletic participants from other harms engendered
by the sport. Any drug-testing rule should contain a statement
of policy and objectives which clearly and explicitly states that it
was promulgated to protect the health of college athletes.
The policy statement for any NCAA promulgated drug-testing rule should also state that the rule is designed to prevent the
exploitation of athletes. The courts have found legitimate state
interests in other NCAA rules which were designed to prevent
the exploitation of the student athlete by overzealous schools,
administrators, or coaches. 133 A drug-testing rule would also
protect the athlete from such exploitation.
College athletics, especially at the higher levels, is very
competitive. 3 4 If athletes feel compelled to take drugs, because
of their own perceived inadequacies, the pressure to win, or at a
coach's urging, these pressures are at least partly responsible
for the athlete's use of harmful drugs. In the first section of a
NCAA drug-testing rule, the NCAA should recognize these
problems and state that the rule was promulgated to end the
potential for exploitation. 135
129. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 200-299 (1983) (drug regulations).
130. See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1982) (empowering statute to prevent and control drug abuse).
131. Rules prohibiting "clipping" (blocking a player from behind in football), "spearing," (football player striking another with top of football helmet) and blocking below the waist in football are all examples of rules
aimed at protecting the health of the players.
132. See supra note 131. The obvious reasons behind these rules is to
protect players.
133. See, e.g., Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (minimum

grade point rule serves legitimate interest by preventing exploitation of athletes). For a more complete list of cases where a rational relationship was
found to exist, see supra note 69.
134. See supra note 100.
135. A possible "Statement of Purposes and Objectives" for a NCAA
drug-testing rule could read as follows:
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
The use of controlled substances and allegedly performance-enhancing drugs represents a danger to the health of students and a
threat to the integrity of amateur sport. In highly competitive athletics, the presence of drugs which allegedly enhance performance
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An additional objective of a drug-testing rule would be to
foster fairness in competition and to protect the integrity of the
game. The NCAA has promulgated rules to protect fairness in
competition and to protect the integrity of the game. 136 Rules in
the areas of academic eligibility, amateurism, recruiting and
gambling serve these purposes. 137 A drug-testing rule would
also foster fairness in competition and protect the integrity of
the game. If drug use were eliminated no NCAA athlete would
have a "chemical advantage." Similarly, cleansing the NCAA of
drugs will improve the association's public image.
In drafting a drug-testing rule which would survive a fourteenth amendment review, the NCAA must adopt a rule which
is "rationally related" to legitimate state objectives. 138 Primarily,
this means that the rule must only provide sanctions for those
athletes who are found to be using specific drugs to improve
their athletic performance. 39 In addition, the NCAA should
only test for the specific allegedly performance-enhancing drugs
which can harm the athletes.' 4° By testing for specific allegedly
performance-enhancing drugs, such as amphetamines and steroids, the NCAA will punish only those athletes who will be
harmed most by the drug use. In addition, the athletes should
not be tested for drugs such as marijuana or alcohol. While
these drugs may also be dangerous to the health of the athlete,
they are not the type of drug which an athlete would use for
enhancing performance.' 4 ' Testing for alcohol, marijuana and
may potentially lead to the exploitation of athletes who feel com-

pelled to take injurious drugs. Drug testing is the only way to identify those students involved in intercollegiate athletics competition
who have used either controlled substance or allegedly performance-enhancing drugs and to eradicate the problem. By ending the
drug problem in college athletics, drug testing will protect the
health of the student and the integrity of amateur athletics and it
will lessen the potential for exploitation of the athletes.
136. See, e.g., NCAA CONST. art. 3, reprintedin MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC

ASSOCIATION 9-24 (1984).

137. Id.
138. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussion of constitutional requirements).
139. For a suggested list of drugs which should be prohibited, see INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MEDICAL GUIDE 23-30

(1984).

140. See supra notes 1, 11, &15.
141. A rule which includes the drugs which are not used by athletes to
improve performance would single out athletes, possibly creating a suspect
class in its application. See supranote 59. The rule would test college athletes for street drugs while not testing their non-athlete peers. In addition,
the wide scope of a rule which tested athletes for all drugs would not be
directed at the harm. The courts have overturned athletic association rules
for being overbroad in relation to the rule's purpose. See, e.g., Howard Univ.
v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 97 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972) (rule providing sanctions against high
school athletes for being caught with alcohol was unreasonably broad).
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similar drugs would result in an over-inclusive classification because it is not aimed at the evils which the rule seeks to
42
prohibit.
A standardized testing procedure is the second necessary
attribute of a rule which would pass fourteenth amendment
scrutiny. 143 The rule should use a standard scientific procedure,
and it should be administered to all competitors after every
NCAA sanctioned event. 14 If the rule were applied at random,
athletes could contend that the administrator's arbitrary control
resulted in the lack of uniformity in the application of the rule.
The rule would not then be susceptible to an attack on the
ground that the test is applied arbitrarily. The testing procedure
should be standardized so that it raises an expectation that testing will occur after each event. The strong deterrence effect of
this expectation will result in a drug-testing rule which will
45
withstand equal protection scrutiny
142. If the rule were applied arbitrarily, athletes would contend that the
lack of uniformity would create a suspect group. A group of athletes singled
out by the test administrators could maintain that the randomly applied
rule violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, San Francisco passed a
law which outlawed hand laundries in wooden buildings. Although most of
the outlawed laundries were run by Chinese persons, the Court invalidated
the ordinance on equal protection grounds because the administrative authorities exempted the non-Oriental laundrymen from compliance with the
rule while the officials did not exempt the Oriental laundrymen. The court
decided that an administrative selection process deserves less deference
than a legislative classification. Id. at 371. See also supra note 59.
143. For a discussion of the Olympic Committee testing program, see
supra note 28.
144. See supra note 142 (uneven application of a rule can cause equal
protection violation).
145. A suggested rule which would succeed in creating this expectation
could resemble the following:
B.

MANDATORY DRUG TESTING

All athletes who participate in NCAA sanctioned events must submit to an NCAA administered urinalysis immediately after each
sanctioned event. Athletes who are found to have a prohibited substance (see Section D-3 of this Rule) in their blood stream at the
time of the test, will be subject to sanction unless they prevail at a
hearing provided by Section D of this rule.
C.

TESTING PROCEDURE

1.

2.

3.

After each event, every competitor shall present a sample of his
or her urine to the NCAA officials. At the time of presentation,
both the competitor and the official shall sign the label of the
urine container.
Every sample shall be frozen and shipped to (name of the accepted testing company) where it will undergo (method of
testing).
The athlete shall be subject to sanctions if his or her urine contains at or above the prescribed level of one or more of the prohibited substances listed below: (prohibited drugs listed with
the amounts necessary to invoke a sanction).
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In addition to equal protection challenges, a proposed drugtesting rule must provide at least minimal procedural safeguards before sanctions are imposed. 146 Present procedural
protections accorded to an NCAA athlete fall far below those
recognized as providing a minimal assurance of fairness. 147 The
present NCAA enforcement procedure also does not lend itself
148
to a drug-testing rule.
In a drug-testing rule, the NCAA should make provisions
which would cure the inadequacies of its present enforcement
program. The drug-testing rule, however, raises some unique
problems in its application. In the fact-finding phase, two
problems deserve attention. First, while the present methods of
drug testing are accurate, 149 large scale testing may result in inaccurate results in isolated circumstances.' 5 0 Athletes should
be allowed to challenge the validity of the test results. Second,
the athletes or their doctors might not know which drugs the
NCAA prohibits. They should be allowed to produce evidence
explaining why they were using certain drugs. Although most of
the allegedly performance-enhancing drugs have few legitimate
uses, certain drugs used by the athlete may be necessary for
valid medical reasons and thus the use should not be sanctioned.' 5 1 Finally, the rule should provide a standardized procesanctions upon a finding
dure for athletes to challenge NCAA
152
that the athlete was using drugs.
4. The list of prohibited substances may be amended prospectively by the Subcommittee on Drugs and Drug Testing. The

amendments must be passed by a simple majority of the NCAA
annual convention. Substances added to this list must be
proven to be harmful to athletes.
146. For a discussion of the court's analysis of NCAA procedural guidelines, see supra note 112.
147. For a discussion of NCAA enforcement procedures, see supranotes
20 and 112.
148. See supranote 20. The drug test would replace the investigative first
stage of the NCAA Enforcement Program. The athlete who fails the test
would therefore already be adjudged guilty before the school had a chance
to represent the athletes. Assuming that the school were to provide representation during an appeal, the school's representative argues only the
facts of a particular situation. In addition, the representatives are not allowed to present mitigating evidence for sentencing nor are there any sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the assumption that the school will represent
the accused drug user's interests adequately is even more tenuous than the
general assumption. Schools will probably not want to side with an athlete
who has failed a drug test.
149. See supranote 14.
150. See supranote 14.
151. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Dr. Cooper) (there
are valid reasons for using drugs and those athletes who must use drugs
should be allowed to do so).
152. The hearing procedure should be streamlined and simple. An example of a "Hearing Procedure" section of a drug test rule could state:
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The sanctioning procedure should also provide the athlete
with procedural protections. Although procedural rights are
rarely accorded to persons contesting sanctioning procedures, 15 3
the drafters of a drug testing rule should recognize certain procedural safeguards not presently accorded to the athletes in the
NCAA enforcement procedure. The procedural rights recommended above give the athlete an opportunity to present facts
which may result in mitigation of the penalty. In addition to the
protection provided by those safeguards, the NCAA's discretion
as to penalties imposed should also be reduced in a drug-testing
rule. Because the rule is aimed primarily at protecting the
health of the athlete, sanctioning guidelines consistent with this
aim should be included in the rule. The rule should require that
first time offenders undergo drug treatment as opposed to a
more harsh penalty. By concentrating on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment, this sanctioning approach attempts to
help the athlete. Subsequent violations, of course, should be
dealt with more harshly. 15 This graduated sanctioning apD.

HEARING PROCEDURE

1. Athletes found to have a prohibited substance at an unacceptable level in their bloodstream shall have the right to a timely
pre-sanction hearing, on the record, before an officer of the subcommittee on Drugs and Drug Testing. The hearing process
will be initiated by the NCAA by the filing of a notice of hearing
with the athlete and the athlete's school.
2. The hearing shall consist of the opportunity for the athlete or
legal representative to present evidence concerning either the
test or the sanction. The athlete or the legal representative
shall be allowed to cross examine representatives of the (testing company) and the testing officials. The athlete or the legal
representative shall also be allowed to produce oral or written
testimony subject to the discretion of the hearing officers.
3. The hearing officer shall issue a written finding of fact within a
reasonable time after the close of the evidence. The athlete is
entitled to notice of the grounds of the hearing officer's findings.
4. Appeals shall be handled by the NCAA Committee on Infractions upon filing of written notice of appeal by the athlete
within 30 days after the athlete receives notice.
153. Although a person may not be deprived of an interest without an
opportunity to be heard, the adjudication on the merits usually satisfies the

due process rights. 1 K. DAVIs,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE

§ 7.02, at 412

(1958). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
154. The "Sanctions" section of the rule should graduate the sanction in
accordance with the purposes of the rule. Basically, the NCAA should look
to help the athlete before invoking more stringent sanctions. In addition to
being fair, the graduated sanctions would be rationally related to the objectives of the rule. The "Sanction" section of the rule could state:
E. SANCTIONS
1. Athletes who have been found by the hearing officer to be using
prohibited substances without justification shall be subject to
sanction by the hearing officer.
2. Sanctions for violation of this rule are as follows:

Drug Testing Rule

19841

proach would be sensible as well as constitutionally sound.
Finally, a constitutionally sound drug-testing rule should
not infringe upon an athlete's right to privacy. Notwithstanding
the limited protections accorded to an athlete's privacy, however, the NCAA should require that each athlete sign a waiver
when the athlete renews his or her scholarship. 155 The waiver
form should fully apprise the athlete of the prohibited drugs, the
method of testing, and the possible sanctions for violation of the
anti-drug rule. The waiver serves a two-fold purpose. First, it
protects the NCAA from possible liability. Second, it protects
the athletes by fully informing them of the program in detail.
The waiver is but another facet of a drug-testing rule which is a
strict measure aimed at protecting athletes in a fair and impartial way.
CONCLUSION

The NCAA must initiate a mandatory drug-testing rule to
help reduce the harm caused by the drug crisis in the lockerroom and on the playing fields of its member institutions. While
no concrete data reveals the extent of this drug problem, athletic
administrators, coaches, and educators have long warned of
widespread use of drugs in athletics. The occasional use of
drugs without a prescription is dangerous. The use of allegedly
performance-enhancing drugs by athletes presents an even
greater potential for irreparable harm. The NCAA has recognized this potential harm by directing the preparation of a
mandatory drug testing rule which will be voted upon at its 1985
156
convention.
A drug-testing rule, however, enacted by the NCAA could
pose certain constitutional problems. Courts have found that
the NCAA is a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, an increasing number of courts have scrutinized NCAA rules and sanctions under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. While the athletes
a)

first time offender shall undergo drug treatment at the university's medical center; or,
b) second time offender shall be suspended from competition
in NCAA events for a period not to exceed one (1) year; or,
c) third time offender shall be ineligible for any NCAA competition in any sport.
3. Neither the NCAA nor a representative of the NCAA will pub-

licly disclose the reason for sanctioning an athlete under this
rule.
155. For a discussion of the athlete's privacy rights and the waiver of
those rights, see supra note 126.
156. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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have had only limited success with challenges to NCAA rules
and sanctions, the special problems which could be raised by a
drug-testing rule necessitate the consideration of special factors.
The drafters of the rule should be aware of these problems.
They should draft a rule which reflects a policy of fairness towards the athletes and which is consonant with the mandates of
the Constitution.
James B. Ford

